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For a long time, the behavior of the controlling shareholder is the core problem in 
corporate governance. A large number of scholars do the researches and analysis from 
the perspective of the corporation value and the enterprise performance. In this paper, 
we will study the above two issues from the perspective of the asset appraisal. This 
article selects the 2007-2014 year evaluation event of assets acquisition in related 
transaction as the research objects, and analysis whether the big shareholder and nature 
of the controlling shareholder can affect the asset appraisal price using excessive value 
added rate as the explanatory variable .  
In reality, the asset appraisal industry competition is intense, besides of facing 
weak legal constraints, in this case assessment agencies is often driven by interests, and 
did not maintain sufficient independence. On the other hand, this paper argues that after 
non-tradable shares reform, under the full circulation pattern of Listing Corporation 
equity, the controlling shareholder, medium and small shareholders and listing company 
has a common interest basis-the stock price. Large shareholder no longer has strong 
motivation for tunneling the listed companies to achieve the private interests, and have 
the potential to produce support behavior. In addition, because the state controlling 
enterprises bear the policy burden, local government has strong incentives to intervene 
state controlling listed company M & A activity and other property right transaction. 
And local government also hopes state controlling listed company become bigger and 
stronger. At the same time with the "synergy" effect of assets injecting, the government 
may therefore lower injecting assets price to support state controlling enterprises. 
Based on this, this paper puts forward the three hypotheses: (1) Compared to the 
assets of general related party, excessive value-added rate of the controlling shareholder 
in assets injection is lower; (2) In assets injection, the higher proportion of controlling 
shareholder, the lower excessive value-added rate; (3) Excessive value-added rate is 
lower when government controls company. Under the research hypothesis, the paper 















is established, which means that after non-tradable shares reform, the controlling 
shareholder asset injection is essentially "support" behavior. At the same time, the 
government provides hand of help in assets injection of the state controlling listed 
company. 
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2012 年珠海中富收购关联方 48 家股权案例，其中 38 家企业处于亏损状态，且
截至 2011 年 12 月 31 日，目标公司经审计账面净资产为 26.10 亿元，而评估价
















































































































































































































































Degree papers are in the “Xiamen University Electronic Theses and 
Dissertations Database”.  
Fulltexts are available in the following ways: 
1. If your library is a CALIS member libraries, please log on 
http://etd.calis.edu.cn/ and submit requests online, or consult the interlibrary 
loan department in your library. 
2. For users of non-CALIS member libraries, please mail to etd@xmu.edu.cn 
for delivery details. 
厦
门
大
学
博
硕
士
论
文
摘
要
库
